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Abstract: This article offers an analysis of the early stages of the revolutions 
that have been taking place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Here we consider 
the early stages of the revolutions from winter 2010-11 up until the summer 
of 2012 and offers a comparative study of the experiences of the early stage 
of the revolutions in each case study. In particular this study considers the 
roles of six variables on the process of regime change and transition as fol-
lows: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change; 2) the initial outcome 
of the revolution/uprising; 3) the number of deaths and casualties; 4) the post-
regime change status of key members of the former governing elite; 5) the 
existence and nature of post-regime change elections; and 6) levels of inter-
national involvement. This study finds that in all three case studies, consider-
ing these variables offers insight into the nature and effect of the early stages 
of the revolutions. Furthermore, in each case there are key similarities in 
some of these variables but significant differences in others which suggest 
that the processes of transition are not directly comparable with each other. 
This article also offers some thoughts on how the early stages of these revo-
lutions could affect the direction and pace of change in each state.  





The Arab Spring (as the revolutions taking place across the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) have come to be known) has significantly al-
tered the political and economic landscape of the region and has already 
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had ramifications for international relations more broadly. It has been ar-
gued (Steinem et al, 2012; Manhire, 2012) that these changes represent the 
most dramatic geo-political development since the 1989-91 period. This ar-
ticle investigates the nature of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya 
from their start to summer 2012 and considers the similarities and differ-
ences between them. We consider the early stages of these revolutions as 
running from winter 2010-11 at the start of the popular uprisings (varying 
but close dates for each case) up until the summer of 2012. Our three case 
studies and the period of time considered have been chosen for a number of 
reasons. Primary among them is that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were the 
first states in the region to experience sustained revolutions. Secondly, they 
were the first states to have experienced regime change as part of the Arab 
Spring. Thirdly, these three states have progressed farther down the line of 
political and economic transition than any other state in the region experi-
encing the Arab Spring. The period of study has been chosen due to the ex-
istence of key processes including: mass uprising, confrontation, regime 
change, transitional government, democratic procedures (in particular elec-
tions), and public discourse and response vis-à-vis the transitional process. 
To address the aims this article analyses the roles of six key variables on 
the revolutionary process and compares them for each state up to the sum-
mer 2012 (what we identify as the early stage of these revolutions) as fol-
lows: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change; 2) the initial out-
come of the revolution/uprising; 3) the number of deaths and casualties; 4) 
the post-regime change status of key members of the former governing 
elite; 5) the existence and nature of post-regime change elections; and 6) 
levels of international involvement.  
 
Analyzing ‘Governance’ in the Middle East and North Africa  
 
The literature on democracy and authoritarianism in the MENA region is 
quite extensive in terms of the quantity of monographs, refereed journal ar-
ticles, reports and other research outputs. However, there are a limited 
number of over-arching themes that are engaged with and drawn upon. 
There are also significant limitations with regards to the range of questions 
that get asked, with a traditional focus on western-centric interests. These 
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realities represent a problem for the analysis of governance in the MENA 
region and revolutionary change, especially in the current environment. 
Raymond Hinnebusch (2006: 373-395) offers a useful overview of the 
dominant themes (but does not aim to break from them entirely) and provides 
us with a useful starting point to present a more eclectic analysis. Among the 
most widely explored themes are those which we can term culture-specific, 
namely, discussions of the role of Islam (and other MENA religions to some 
extent) and ethnicity (primarily Arab and Persian but also others including 
Kurdish, Berber and Turkomen) in the forms of governance witnessed in the 
region. Bernard Lewis (2003: 208-219), Samuel Huntington (1984: 193-
218), Thomas Friedman (for a useful discussion see Fernandez, 2011), and 
Elie Kedourie (1992) have discussed forms of governance in the MENA re-
gion predominantly through the culture-specific lens and their works have 
been influential in some parts of the academic and policy-making communi-
ties in the West. The general arguments and conclusions that these and other 
scholars make are often very similar and hinge on the beliefs that Islam (and 
other MENA religions) and ethnicity (predominantly Arab and Persian, 
which get used interchangeably) determine what form of governance a 
state/community has. Bernard Lewis in particular has long been an advocate 
of the argument that Islam is more of a political ideology than a religion and 
that it is an ideology which is inherently incompatible with democracy 
(which he assumes to be one thing for the entire world over: Western democ-
racy (Lewis, 2003)). At the same time Ellie Kedourie has focused on Arab 
culture as being one supportive of patriarchy, paternalism, and autocratic rule 
9Kedourie, 1992). Again, the assumption here is that all Arabs, just as all 
Muslims for Lewis, are the same and represent one monolithic and unitary 
community. This approach is something we hold to be not only grossly incor-
rect but also harmfully misleading. As Katerina Dalacoura (2012: 63-79) ar-
gues, thinking of the Arab world as one unitary block and thinking of an Ar-
ab event or process can ‘constitute a set of blinkers’ (ibid: 63). 
A second theme in the literature that reinforces this culture-specific one 
is a historicism. This is the belief that the history for the MENA region is 
static and unchanging in so far as one can examine a series of events, pro-
cesses and structures from one era, say 1000C.E., and find general laws ap-
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plicable to the region today. Samuel Huntington adopts this theme to sup-
port his understanding of international relations as being characterised by a 
balancing act between different religio-cultural groups (1996). These schol-
ars have been critiqued in detail elsewhere (See: Hinnebusch, 2006; El 
Badawi and Makdisi, 2011) and are often seen as overly subjective in their 
treatment of the MENA region in general. However, they are not the only 
ones who have adopted a culture-specific and ahistorical approach to under-
standing governance in the MENA region. Even scholars who are more ob-
jective in their analyses or who are subjective, but offer a measure of respect-
ful understanding of and interest in the MENA region and the people who re-
side there often add to the literature that uses these two themes. Amaney 
Jamal (2006: 51-63), for example, has written about the relationship between 
Islam and governance as well as on perceptions of and support for democra-
cy in Islam. Jamal’s work offers a more balanced and effective analysis of 
the dynamic and varied nature of Islam and how it can influence political 
discourse (and when it does not), but at the same time and perhaps in re-
sponse to those more critical of Islam’s influence, Jamal still engages with a 
culture-specific (but not ahistorical) approach. In parts of Overstating the Ar-
ab State Nazih Ayubi (1995: 399) also engages with this debate, highlighting 
that within Islam (and other monotheistic religions) there are many interpre-
tations, practices and discursive elements which encourage mass engagement 
with politics and representative government, such as ijtihad (interpretive 
judgement), ijma (consensus) and shura (consultation). While directly chal-
lenging the arguments of Lewis, Huntington, Kedourie, Friedman and others, 
Ayubi nonetheless still approaches governance in the MENA region by 
drawing on a culture-specific epistemology. Fadia Faqir (1997: 165-174), 
Tariq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael (2011), Sami Baroudi (2004: 132-141), 
and Muqtader Khan (2005) have all offered coherent analyses that focus on 
religion and/or ethnicity and governance. The culture-specific theme has 
been dominant in discussions of governance in the MENA region. At the 
same time, however, there are alternative themes which are also important in 
this area of study and can offer more convincing analyses. 
Analyses which consider aspects of political economy offer another type 
of approach to understanding and explaining forms of governance and tend 
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not to engage with culture-specific themes and are not ahistorical in ap-
proach. While discussing Islam and politics, Jamal (2005: 545-547), for ex-
ample, has also explored the relationship between economic reform and 
democratisation in the Arab world, concluding that economic and political 
reform are essential pre-requisites. On the other hand Samih Farsoun and 
Christina Zacharia (1995) offer a discussion outlining the ways in which 
liberal economic reform does not necessarily lead to democracy in the short 
term, but may in fact reinforce authoritarianism. Elsewhere, Burhan 
Ghalioun (2004: 126-132) has argued that some governments in the MENA 
region (for example, in Tunisia and Egypt) have reneged on the state-
society social contracts established in the first post-independence decades, 
by adopting IMF-inspired structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and 
neoliberal economic reform, thus reducing their national legitimacy and 
limiting their ability to democratise.  
As has been demonstrated throughout the experiences of the Arab 
Spring, media technologies such as satellite TV, the internet and mobile 
communications devices are increasingly important as tools to be used in 
political reform. Lawrence Pintak (2008) offers a good discussion of how 
the changing political economy of these tools is having a significant impact 
on opening up space for political discourse. Pintak argues that ownership 
structures are highly significant here. One compelling study by Ibrahim El 
Badawi and Samir Makdisi (2007: 813-831) concludes that the political 
economy of hydrocarbons and conflicts in the region represent a ‘dummy’ ef-
fect which is unique to the region in terms of how it impacts patterns of gov-
ernance. They argue that it is these factors that determine forms of govern-
ance in the MENA and not religion or other cultural phenomena. The exist-
ence of effective state services, the rule of law, economically dynamic mid-
dle classes, high levels of literacy and educational enrolment have also been 
seen as key features of the region’s political economy that need to be realised 
in order for representative government to be established (2008: 151-160).  
 
The Framework of Analysis 
 
In some respects we can find faults with the key elements of the political 
economy theme as well as with the culture-specific and ahistorical ap-
8 0  ▪  I m a d  E l - A n i s  a n d  A s h r a f  H a m e d  
 
proaches in discussions of governance in the MENA region. Nevertheless, 
it is not within the remit of this study to engage with these debates further. 
We will simply acknowledge their dominance in the existing literature and 
move on to outlining the theoretical and methodological approach used in 
this study, which reflects closely a political economy approach but differs 
from existing analyses in the key political, economic and security variables 
we consider. Here we do not seek to provide a generalised model that can 
be applied to all states and communities in the MENA region (something 
that the culture-specific approach tends to do). Instead we find more merit 
in considering each state as different and as having some specific historical 
processes of social, political and economic change, and unique security and 
international relationships, while at the same time sharing some similari-
ties: the analysis presents a set of questions that can be applied to other cas-
es of revolutionary change in the MENA region.  
As a key starting point, we adopt Hinnebusch’s (2006) understanding of 
the potential for post-authoritarian politics in the MENA region. This mod-
el suggests that there are two possible paths towards democratisation in the 
region. Firstly, if authoritarian governments can ‘deliver increased rule of 
law, better regulatory frameworks, educational reforms and merit-based re-
cruitment to the bureaucracy, they will precipitate the investment and eco-
nomic growth needed to expand the middle class, civil society and an inde-
pendent bourgeoisie’ (ibid: 391-392) necessary for democracy to take root. 
Outside of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), governments have thus 
far been largely unable to provide any of these things and the Arab Spring 
has demonstrated that time is likely up for this path to democracy to mate-
rialise. This leads us to the second potential path to representative govern-
ment: regime change/collapse could provide the setting for cross-society 
coordination and participation in politics – but this needs to be a domestic 
process without significant involvement by external actors (ibid: 392). Un-
derlying both of these possibilities is the political economy of employment, 
poverty reduction and economic advancement. 
The Polity IV method is the most widely used method to identify levels 
of democratic governance and while it has some short-comings it is the 
most effective approach and we draw upon its definitions of democracy and 
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authoritarianism here. Media analysis is used to further our understanding 
of the process of revolution in the early stage. It is worth highlighting again 
here the variables that have been studied as for each of the three case stud-
ies. These are: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change, 2) initial 
outcome (with three possibilities – revolutionary/rebel victory and success-
ful un-negotiated regime change, a negotiated settlement for the regime to 
remain but reform, a negotiated regime change, and finally governmental 
victory and maintenance of the status quo), 3) number of deaths and casual-
ties, 4) post-regime change status of members of the former governing elite, 
5) elections, and 6) international involvement (ranging from low levels (in-
ternational media coverage, diplomatic activity and so on) to high levels 
(external military involvement) and where greater international involve-
ment can complicate the processes of change unfolding). We now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of these variables.  
Wagner (1993) claims that the duration of uprisings and civil conflicts is 
largely determined by whether one side is able to achieve a decisive politi-
cal and/or military victory and/or the willingness of all parties to negotiate 
a settlement. On the other hand Cunningham (2010: 116) echoes these 
claims but in addition suggests that external intervention also has an impact 
on the length of uprisings and civil wars. We posit that the amount of time 
taken to achieve regime change directly affects the ability of the new re-
gime, and civil society and political actors to provide the public goods and 
services required for a stable and efficient move to democracy. If the pro-
cess of regime change takes longer the resulting disruption to the operations 
of government and other public, civil society and economic actors will in-
crease, negatively impacting the ability of these actors to support the de-
mocratisation process. The initial outcome of any uprising or civil conflict 
has perhaps the most immediate impact on the potential for democratic 
change. Here, the existing authoritarian regime must be either removed 
from power or compelled to irreversibly commit to rapid democratic reform 
in order for democratisation to occur. Governmental victory in suppressing 
any revolutionary movement will result in continued authoritarian rule. At 
the same time a negotiated regime change has the potential to facilitate de-
mocratisation but is likely to result in the maintenance of the status quo in 
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the medium- to long-term due to significant elements of the former regime 
remaining in post/positions of power and influence.  
There is a direct (and negative) correlation between the number of deaths 
and casualties caused during the early stages of revolutions and civil con-
flicts and future reconciliation, whether regime change occurs or not. A 
greater number of deaths and casualties (in absolute terms when comparing 
cases), as well as overall destruction of property and infrastructure, leads to 
divisions within society, an inability of the judicial system (both domestic 
and international) to investigate and conclude criminal cases, high financial 
costs to the public and private sectors, and social feuds. Combined, these 
pose challenges to democratic change as this relies on national coordina-
tion, reconciliation and socio-economic normalisation.  
With regards to the fourth variable, the accountability of the former gov-
erning elite (for corruption, police brutality, lack of transparency and open-
ness, political censorship, electoral fraud, high levels of poverty and unem-
ployment, as well as a lack of social welfare) was in many ways the key fac-
tor driving these revolutions. As such, the status of the former ruling elite is 
very important for the continued transition towards democracy. The ability of 
the former governing elite to promote counter-revolutionary interests is also 
very important. The continued existence of old-guard actors in positions of 
power (or with access to those in power) and who maintain their political and 
economic interests and relationships pose serious challenges to transitions 
away from the previous regime. Revolutions which take place in opposition 
to authoritarian governments, such as the Arab Spring revolutions, take place 
in order to replace the existing regime with a fairer and more representative 
one. Elections represent the most important and overt element of democratic 
governance and the ability of post-regime change governments to legislate, 
organise and conduct fair and transparent electoral processes is very im-
portant in satisfying the demands of the masses. Elections, therefore, repre-
sent key indicators of a government’s progress in democratising.  
There are two main ways in which external actors can intervene in any 
domestic revolution or civil conflict: firstly, they can intervene diplomati-
cally to facilitate negotiations between the domestic actors in order to nor-
malise the situation. Secondly, external actors can militarily intervene (in 
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particular in the case of civil conflicts by providing military and economic 
support for one side or another (or perhaps covertly to both) (ibid). Much 
literature on civil conflicts suggests that external interventions are im-
portant in affecting the outcome of the domestic processes of change taking 
place. El Badawi and Sambanis (2000: 244-269), and Reagan (2002: 55-73) 
demonstrate that external interventions directly affect the duration and 
eventual outcome of civil wars and civil uprisings. Direct military interven-
tion on behalf of the weaker group in any civil war tends to prolong the 
conflict due to an approach to parity in the domestic balance of power. This 
is usually then followed by an imbalance and subsequent victory for one 
side over time. At the same time military involvement is not the only im-
portant form of international relationship that is important. Post-regime 
change processes of democratisation can be helped by transparent and un-
biased international involvement. For example, in helping to organise elec-
tions, providing financial assistance to the government to help provide pub-
lic goods and services, and help in reconstruction efforts where needed. 
However, where external involvement is intense and embedded in domestic 
political and economic processes the pace of change is likely to be slowed. 
We now explore the nature and impact of these variables in the early revo-
lutionary stages in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. 
 
Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Tunisia  
 
The catalyst of the broader region-wide process commonly referred to as 
the Arab Spring began in Tunisia which was the first state in the MENA 
region to experience a campaign of civil resistance and regime change. The 
events leading up to the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the 
small central town of Sidi Bouzid have been recounted in detail elsewhere 
(See: West, 2011; Dabashi, 2012; Noueihed and Warren, 2012) and will not 
be done so again here. But suffice it to recount that this event occurred on 
December 17, 2010 and by the following day significant protests had start-
ed in Sidi Bouzid. Heavy-handed governmental repression of the peaceful 
protests that began on December 18, 2010 and wide-spread police brutality 
helped to encourage protests and civil resistance across Tunisia in the fol-
lowing weeks with protests and strikes reaching Tunis by December 27, 
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2010. By the start of January 2011 wide-spread strikes by worker’s unions 
across the country had begun. For example, on January 6, 2011 the chair-
man of the national bar association announced that virtually all of Tunisia’s 
lawyers had gone on strike in protest to government repression of peaceful 
protests and more specifically the beating of lawyers during the preceding 
week. National teachers’ and other labour unions had joined the strike with-
in days of this announcement.  
As the protests progressed the governmental response was characterised 
by two over-arching features. The first was ever-intensifying police brutali-
ty and physical repression of protests. The second was half-hearted at-
tempts at appeasing the demands of the protesters and the erection of a fa-
çade of promised reforms (ICG, 2011a: 3-5). These tactics would ultimate-
ly prove ineffective in stemming the revolutionary process and on January 
14, 2011 President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali officially resigned after fleeing 
to Saudi Arabia (Al Jazeera, January 15 2011).
 But Ben Ali’s removal from 
power (the first such modern experience of a MENA dictator being re-
moved from power by a civil movement) did not end the revolution. The 
motivating factors behind the revolution were much deeper than just the 
leadership of one man. Immediately following Ben Ali’s departure a care-
taker government was installed and Fouad Mebazaa and Mohamed 
Ghanouchi were confirmed as President and Prime Minister respectively. 
However, the inclusion of Ghannouchi and other members of Ben Ali’s 
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as the majority in the new 
government reinforced the revolution as protesters called for the disband-
ment of the RCD and the removal of all RCD members from the govern-
ment, as well as the holding of free and fair elections. Following further 
civil resistance, Prime Minister Ghannouchi removed all RCD members 
from the government and then resigned on February 27, 2011, and the RCD 
was dissolved on March 9, 2011 (see: Dabashi, 2012). The outcome of this 
revolution can be classified as the first of our four categories: revolutionary 
victory and un-negotiated regime change.  
We can argue that the most important single mile-stone of the Arab 
Spring revolutions (but certainly not the only key event) is the removal of 
the incumbent leader. This took eighteen days in Tunisia but revolutionary 
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change continues at the time of writing. According to the most reliable 
governmental and media figures, the revolution resulted in approximately 
220 deaths (mostly civilians) and over 500 casualties (again, mostly civil-
ians) (Al Jazeera, January 23, 2011). These are relatively small figures for a 
revolution that resulted in regime change, especially when compared to the 
other two case studies. This would suggest that reconciliation within Tuni-
sia in the post-regime change transition would not be as deeply affected as 
in Egypt or Libya as discussed below.   
One of the key influences on post-regime change transition, as discussed 
above, is the status of the former governing elite. If this elite mostly main-
tains the same political and economic status and existing power relation-
ships are preserved then the transition to a new system of governance will 
be negatively affected. There will also be the emergence of a counter-
revolutionary movement. In the Tunisian case a significant amount of the 
core governing-elite left Tunisia all-together in the period up to summer 
2012. Ben Ali and his closest relatives and aides fled to Saudi Arabia, 
France and other Euro-Med states taking with them vast amounts of money 
and resources (Byrne, 2012). On the other hand, a significant number of Ben 
Ali’s close friends and relatives were arrested in Tunisia (Chrisafis, 2011). 
On June 20, 2011 Ben Ali along with his wife were sentenced in absentia to 
35 years in prison for money laundering, theft and unlawful possession of 
money and jewellery (Adetuniji, 2011). Interpol issued an arrest warrant for 
Ben Ali on January 28, 2011 and the Tunisian government asked the Saudi 
government to extradite Ben Ali to serve his prison sentence. However, nei-
ther effort has had any affect and is unlikely to in the future. 
At the same time other former leading political and economic actors have 
also moved elsewhere, albeit perhaps only temporarily in some cases. By 
summer 2012 there were a significant number of former RCD members still 
in Tunisia but not all were politically active and those that were tended to be 
bureaucrats and technocrats as opposed to formerly central figures (ICG, 
2012a: 1-38). Overall, the new government did not seek to investigate, arrest 
and/or put on trial former regime members with much haste for fear of desta-
bilising the transition (ibid). This caused some tension between the new gov-
ernment and the public as many saw the failure to bring to justice those who 
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committed crimes against protesters during the revolution as a sign of con-
tinued impunity for such crimes (common under the Ben Ali regime) (ibid).  
On October 23, 2011 national elections were held for the National Con-
stituent Assembly (NCA). This body of 217 lawmakers was charged with 
re-writing the constitution and ushering in further democratic processes in-
cluding further parliamentary elections once a new constitution was created 
(the initial timeframe given under the temporary legislation created to ena-
ble the election was one year, however, this was subsequently extended). 
These elections were widely acclaimed as transparent and fair by both Tu-
nisian and international observers and commentators – over 10,000 Tunisi-
an and 500 international observers witnessed the election. In the spring of 
2011 political space was opened up and all formerly-banned political par-
ties were legalised leading to almost 100 political parties emerging in the 
months up to the NCA elections. The main parties to emerge were 
Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic, the Progressive Democratic Front, 
and the Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice and Development. The for-
merly-banned, moderate Islamist party Ennahda won the October elections 
with 41% of the total vote and 89 out of the 217 seats in the NCA (Al 
Jazeera, October 26, 2011). Ennahda subsequently  nominated Hamadi 
Jebali, its secretary-general, for the position of Prime Minister and this ap-
pointment was confirmed on December 14, 2011 by the NCA-elected Pres-
ident, Moncef Marzouki, of the CPR (BBC News, November 21, 2012). By 
summer 2012 the NCA had created a new constitution and was set an-
nounced new elections for parliament by the end of 2012.  
During the early stages of the revolution international support for the 
civil movement came from both civil society and governments in the 
MENA region, Europe and beyond. However, there was not a significant 
level of overt international involvement leading up to the point of regime 
change (although rather ironically the French government did initially offer 
to send French paramilitary forces to help suppress the uprising (Samuel, 
2011)). The regime change in Tunisia was mostly isolated from interna-
tional influences and it was only by the late 2011 in the post-regime change 
phase that international financial, political and civil society relationships 
became more important. 
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Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Egypt 
 
While the revolution in Tunisia was in its early stages a civil movement for 
change emerged in Egypt, the second state in the region to experience the 
Arab Spring (with Yemen almost simultaneously experiencing the start of 
its revolution). As with the discussions of Tunisia’s revolution it is not nec-
essary to revisit the events of the early stage of the revolution in Egypt in 
detail, rather it is necessary to highlight some of the key events and stages 
leading up to regime change and the subsequent transition period. The 
revolution started in earnest on January 25, 2011 in cities across Egypt with 
peaceful mass protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, large scale la-
bour strikes and the occupation of key locales like Cairo’s Tahrir Square 
continuing through February 2011. The government’s response was similar 
to that of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia: heavy-handed suppression of peace-
ful demonstrations using the police and hired thugs, arbitrary arrests, deten-
tion and torture, and imposition of curfews as well as the enforcement of 
emergency laws (which having been in place since 1981 had been relaxed 
somewhat in more recent years) (Al Jazeera, January 25, 2011). The gov-
ernment also tried to appease the protest movement in much the same way 
as Ben Ali tried to do in Tunisia. But the Mubarak regime was unsuccessful 
in stemming the tide of public frustration and anger. The more the govern-
ment responded with force while at the same time using the same language 
of democratisation and change that the protesters themselves were using, 
the more cynical and brutal the regime looked. The infamous battle of the 
camels in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011 was seen as a particularly 
dramatic event and one that highlighted the nature of the regime and Mu-
barak’s apparent untrustworthiness.  
Following several days of massive labour strikes which were organised 
by Egypt’s main trade and labour unions Hosni Mubarak was compelled to 
step down from the Presidency on February 11, 2011, just eighteen days af-
ter the protests started (compared to the 28 days it took for Ben Ali to flee 
Tunisia) (BBC News, February 12, 2011).  His newly appointed Vice Pres-
ident Omar Suleiman also stepped down from his position (Mubarak had 
not appointed a Vice President since he took office until the uprising began, 
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wrongly believing this move would placate the protesters). Following his 
resignation, Muabarak’s former ruling party, the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), was dissolved and all its assets transferred to the state (BBC News, 
April 16, 2011). The parliament was also dissolved pending future demo-
cratic elections while the constitution was suspended pending the creation 
of a new one by a democratically elected national assembly. Furthermore, 
the hated State Security Investigations Service was disbanded and Mubarak 
and many of his former governing elite were investigated, arrested and in 
many cases put on trial. The military forces, through the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the reins of power following Mu-
barak’s resignation (discussed more below).  
Overall, the early stage of the revolution in Egypt led to a form of nego-
tiated regime change with the military acting as the mediator, successor re-
gime and then handing over to a transitional government. While the revolu-
tionary movement required less time to bring down the Mubarak regime 
than it took in Tunisia to remove Ben Ali from power, the number of deaths 
and causalities was higher in Egypt with approximately 850 deaths and 
6000 casualties (BBC News, April 19, 2011) up until Mubarak’s resigna-
tion and then several hundred in each category up until summer 2012 as the 
revolution continued in protest to the SCAF’s domination. One would ex-
pect that these higher numbers of deaths and casualties would have a nega-
tive influence on the transitional period and many in Egypt blamed the 
SCAF for failing to protect civilians adequately and as even being respon-
sible for further deaths and casualties through 2011 and 2012 once it took 
power (BBC News, November 21, 2011).  
Unlike the experience of Ben Ali’s former governing elite, the former 
governing elite from Mubarak’s regime largely remained in Egypt and 
some key individuals either were side-lined by the SCAF and the civil 
movements or were arrested and put on trial for various crimes relating to 
the government’s behaviour during the revolution for crimes dating back 
through Mubarak’s rule (BBC News, May 4, 2012). Ain the early stage of 
the revolution in Egypt, Mubarak himself had his assets frozen in late Feb-
ruary 2011, was placed under arrest in mid-April 2011, was put on trial for 
complicity in the killing of protestors and for corruption, and was found 
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guilty for the former and sentenced to life in prison by late summer 2012. 
This trial began on August 3, 2011 when Mubarak, his two sons Gamal and 
Alaa, Mubarak’s Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly along with six of his top 
aides, were charged with pre-meditated murder (pertaining to the killing of 
protesters during the revolution), embezzlement and corruption. On June 2, 
2012 Mubarak and Al-Adly were both sentenced to life in prison, but Mu-
barak’s sons and the six top security aides were acquitted (Al Jazeera, June 
2, 2012). The trial was plagued by interruptions and seen to be weak overall 
with limited hard evidence presented, SCAF mismanagement and hesita-
tion, and witnesses for the prosecution changing testimony once on the 
stand in favour of Mubarak’s defence. However, other top Mubarak era in-
dividuals were also investigated, charged, arrested and put on trial (mostly 
for corruption, embezzlement and bribery) from March 2011 onwards. The-
se trials and hearings were managed more effectively than that of Mubarak 
and included the former secretary of the NDP for organisational affairs 
Ahmed Ezz, former Minister of Trade Rachid Mohammed Rachid and for-
mer Housing Minister Ahmed El Maghrabi (El-Nahhas, 2011). The process 
of investigating and trying former regime officials proceeded quite well and 
a higher proportion of cases were closed than in Tunisia. For example, 
Rachid was tried in absentia, found guilty of embezzlement and sentenced 
to five years in prison by late June 2011 (Al Jazeera, June 25, 2011).  
Parliamentary elections were held in several rounds from late November 
2011 until mid-January 2012. These served to appease some of the main 
concerns of the masses. These elections saw key changes to Mubarak era 
electoral legislation, allowing for two-thirds of the parliamentary seats to 
go to candidates (both independents and party members) elected by propor-
tional representation and one third elected using the first-past-the-post 
method (subsequently amended by the SCAF). The minimum age of candi-
dacy was lowered from 30 to 25. These changes were among the key de-
mands made by many of the political parties that contested the elections 
and were authorised by the SCAF following months of debate and pressure. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won 47.2% of the 
votes while the Salafist party Al-Nour won 24.7% resulting in the parlia-
ment being dominated by Islamists (Al-Ahram, 2012). However, on June 
9 0  ▪  I m a d  E l - A n i s  a n d  A s h r a f  H a m e d  
 
14, 2012 Egypt’s Supreme Court declared that the parliamentary elections 
had been carried out unconstitutionally as one third of the seats should have 
been reserved for independents but were actually contested by members of 
political parties (BBC News, June 14, 2012). Following the court’s an-
nouncement the SCAF declared the parliament to be unconstitutional and 
ordered its dissolution. All legislative powers, the responsibility to write the 
new constitution, control over the budget and autonomy in military matters, 
were seized by the SCAF (see: Al-Ahram, June 18, 2012; Al Jazeera, June 
18, 2012) causing dismay across the political spectrum in Egypt with sup-
porters of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Nour, leftists, communists, various 
youth movements and others coordinating in their condemnation of this de-
cision and demanding the parliament be restored.  
Presidential elections were held on May 23-24, 2012 representing the 
first democratically contested presidential election in modern Egyptian his-
tory (the 2005 presidential election was officially contested but was charac-
terised by fraud, governmental interference and other violations). Nine can-
didates were allowed to run in the election with three main competitors re-
ceiving most public support prior to the election. The first round of the 
election did not result in an out-right majority of 50% or more for any can-
didate. Former Mubarak-era Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafiq and Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Morsi were the two leading candidates 
in the first round with approximately 24% and 26% of the votes respective-
ly. Shafiq and Morsi faced each other in an election run-off which took 
place on June 16-17, 2012. The first round of the election was largely seen 
as transparent and fair although some irregularities were reported and sev-
eral of the other candidates led by Hamdeen Sabahi called for a partial re-
count and the suspension of the second round run-off until allegations of 
vote-rigging could be answered. The run-off took place on time, however, 
and Ahmed Shafik was declared eligible following a decision by the consti-
tutional court which was considering the constitutionality of an earlier par-
liamentary decree barring any Mubarak-era officials from office. On June 24, 
2012 the electoral commission declared Morsi the winner of the run-off with 
51.85% of the vote (BBC News, June 25, 2012). Since assuming power the 
SCAF repeatedly declared that it would hand over power to a democratically 
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elected civilian government once the presidential elections had been held and 
a new government formed (Al Ghad, 2012)  and it was amongst the first to 
issue a statement congratulating Morsi on his victory. It had fully handed 
over power to the civilian government by late summer 2012. 
During the 18 days of protest and uprising that toppled the Mubarak re-
gime the international community remained largely excluded from what was 
happening inside Egypt. From Arab League states to the European Union, the 
United Nations and the United States, external actors were left several steps 
behind as they tried to understand what was happening in Egypt and what 
would happen to their allies there (ICG, 2011b). The United States limited its 
public statements to urging both the Egyptian government and the protesters 
to refrain from violence and to engage in dialogue. Washington remained 
wary of the outcome of the uprising and it seemed above all to not want to 
see an unstable and/or anti-west regime emerge there. Leaders in both Wash-
ington and European capitals were largely caught off-guard by the events in 
Egypt and the disparity in their statements from one day to the next suggests 
that their need to address different constituencies at home and internationally 
limited their ability to influence the events in Egypt (ibid, p. 26). Above all it 
was perhaps Washington’s close relationship with the Mubarak regime that 
restricted its agency in Egypt. Unable to put too much pressure on Mubarak 
for fear of being seen to overtly suppress democracy (which the United States 
has long professed it seeks to support (see: Brinkley, 1997: 110-127; Cox et 
al, 2000)) and thus increase the resentment and dislike that many Egyptians 
already feel for US policy, while at the same time being unable to throw its 
lot in completely with the protesters for fear that instability and an anti-
United States regime would emerge left Washington with few real options. 
European and Arab states found themselves in much the same position. The 
period following Mubarak’s resignation up until summer 2012 saw greater 
international involvement and the key international and regional actors de-
veloped more coherent policies towards the transition in Egypt. 
 
Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Libya 
 
On February 15, 2011, just four days after Mubarak stepped down in 
Egypt, protests broke out in Benghazi in eastern Libya. As had happened in 
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Tunisia and Egypt the protests spread quickly to most of the east of the 
country and to parts of the west. Protesters were concerned by police bru-
tality, governmental censorship, restrictions on media, freedom of speech, 
representation, mass arrests and torture, as well as economic corruption, 
unemployment and poverty (ICG, 2011c). Gadhafi’s response was even less 
flexible than Ben Ali’s or Mubarak’s. The regime responded to the protests 
by brutally suppressing the peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi and else-
where in Libya using police and paramilitary forces (ibid). Gadhafi himself 
vowed to fight with all of the resources available to him to suppress what be-
came a full-scale uprising, offering no concessions to the opposition. Contra-
ry to the events in Tunisia and Egypt where military forces did not engage 
the protesters, in Libya military forces were deployed almost immediately 
and were heavily involved in suppressing protests. This helped lead to a mili-
tary response from the protesters and instead of suppressing the protests, the 
more people Gadhafi’s forces killed the more Libyans were compelled to join 
the uprising (ibid: 5). By late March 2011 the opposition was able to spread 
the uprising across most of Libya and had founded a National Transitional 
Council (NTC) to act as a government in opposition (ibid: 24).  
The conflict that emerged in Libya lasted for just over eight months until 
all of Libya, including Tripoli, Sirte and Sabha (the last major Gadhafi 
strongholds) were taken by the rebels. The resulting regime change with the 
NTC taking power for the transitional period and the Gadhafi regime over-
thrown is exemplary of a rebel victory and un-negotiated regime change. 
This all came at a very heavy cost in lives, however, with conservative es-
timates setting the total at approximately 10,000 deaths and a further 
20,000 casualties – with the UN Human Rights Council reporting 10-
15,000 deaths by June 2011 (Reuters, June 9, 2011) and the NTC calculat-
ing 25,000 by the end of the conflict (IISS, 2011). The lengthy duration of 
the conflict had a direct impact on the level of destruction of infrastructure 
and property, number of deaths and casualties. The international involve-
ment in the conflict as discussed below also contributed to these factors.  
By late summer 2012 many of the former governing elite under the 
Gadhafi regime were either arrested, killed in the conflict or fled the coun-
try – it is important to note that during the uprising and conflict many gov-
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ernment employees resigned their posts and many defected to the opposi-
tion. Muammar Gadhafi was killed on October 20, 2011 as he tried to es-
cape from Sirte. Several of his close relatives were also killed during the 
conflict, including Khamis Gadhafi, Gadhafi’s youngest son and com-
mander of the infamous Khamis Brigade (which was the most well-armed 
security force in Libya at the start of the conflict and was responsible for 
heinous crimes during the fighting) who was killed in a NATO and rebel 
attack on his convoy south of Tripoli on August 29, 2011 (Reuters, August 
30, 2011). Saif Al-Islam Gadhafi, son and heir apparent to Gadhafi was 
captured in the southern desert near the town of Urabi by militiamen from 
Zintan. He was held without charge by this militia (BBC News, April 18, 
2011). Another of Gadhafi’s sons, Saadi Al-Gadhafi, was granted asylum 
in Niger on humanitarian grounds but his movement was largely restricted. 
Former intelligence chief, Abdullah Al-Senussi (long seen as one of the 
more brutal individuals in the Gadhafi regime) was arrested in Mauritania 
after having flown there from Morocco on a false passport. In addition, Ali 
Al- Mahmudi, the former prime minister has been extradited to Libya from 
Tunisia where he had sought political asylum (Al Jazeera, June 25, 2012). 
The events of the conflict and its aftermath resulted in the former governing 
elite being depleted, fractured and displaced suggesting that their influence 
on Libyan politics was limited. 
One of the key goals as professed by the NTC following the end of the 
conflict was to conduct parliamentary elections for a temporary government 
to write a new constitution and organise another round of elections for a 
full-term parliament and government. This project moved forward with 
elections for local councils being held in May and June 2012 and parlia-
mentary elections held on July 7, 2012. The intention was then for a Public 
National Conference/parliament to write the new constitution paving the 
way for further elections and representative government in 2013 (Al 
Jazeera, January 22, 2012). In order to conduct these elections the NTC 
produced new electoral legislation establishing the number of seats in par-
liament (200), the voting system (parallel voting), the age to stand for elec-
tion (21 years), the constituency to party list seats ratio (120:80) and eligi-
bility (dual nationality candidates are eligible) (UN, 2012). The political 
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space that opened up in Libya allowing for these parties and many more to 
organise and become active is quite remarkable given the past 40-plus years 
of stunted political discourse.  
The level of international involvement in the Libyan revolution was 
greater than in the other two case studies and continues in the form of fi-
nancial, political and technical support as well as military engagement. By 
late February 2011 a number of Arab League states condemned the Gadhafi 
regime’s response to the protests and offered financial and other support to 
the revolutionaries. At the same time the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
passed resolution 1970 placing sanctions on Gadhafi and his regime. A fur-
ther UNSC resolution (UNSC 1973) authorised the establishment of a no-
fly zone over Libya, a sea blockade and action to protect civilian popula-
tions. Following these resolutions an international coalition of states pro-
vided military forces to enforce the no-fly-zone and assist the rebel move-
ment as it slowly gained control of Libya (BBC News, March 25, 2011). 
Overall, 19 states (Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Holland, Italy, Jordan, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, UAE, UK and USA.) contributed to the military intervention either 
by providing supplies, infrastructure, financial resources or engaging in 
combat operations. The broad-ranging coalition of states helped to legiti-
mise the UN-authorised action to some extent and in particular the in-
volvement of Arab states was important in this regard. Without the interna-
tional military involvement it is unlikely that the uprising would have suc-
ceeded in over-throwing Gadhafi as the regime’s military forces, training 
and coordination were on the whole far more effective than those of the re-
bels. For example, the counter-attack by Gadhafi forces in the first month 
of the uprising was poised to quell the rebellion in eastern Libya, in particu-
lar in Benghazi, until NATO air strikes destroyed much of the regime forc-
es approaching the city. Many observers, however, have questioned the ex-
tent to which the NATO operations surpassed their UN mandate by not on-
ly protecting civilian populations but also coordinating with the rebel forces 
and conducting offensive joint military operations with them.  
Following the fall of the Gadhafi regime and the end of the conflict in Oc-
tober 2011 the international military intervention ended and the UN mandate 
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completed (Al Jazeera, October 31, 2011). International involvement in Lib-
ya through the summer 2012 remained significant with many in the interna-
tional community offering financial, technical, diplomatic and other support. 
Libya was suspended from the Arab League on February 22, 2011 as a result 
of the Gadhafi regime’s crackdown on the uprising, however, its membership 
was restored in August 2011 following an Arab League vote in favour of 
recognition of the NTC as the representative authority of Libya (Al-Ahram, 
August 28, 2011). The Arab League continued to work closely with the NTC 
in its reconstruction efforts and political development.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of initial regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya  
 
 
*Where: 1 = revolutionary/rebel victory and successful un-negotiated regime 
change; 2 = a negotiated settlement for the regime to remain but reform; 3 = a ne-





The findings of this project suggest that the events and processes of the 
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya up to summer 2012 shared some 
similarities but differed in key ways. The nature of regime change and level 
of casualties in particular differed and directly affected the pace and direc-
 Tunisia Egypt Libya 
Duration 28 days 18 days 8 months 




c.310 c.1100 c.10,000-20,000 
Status of former 
elite 




Elections Held Yes Yes Planned 
International 
Involvement 
Low Medium High 
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tion of subsequent change. The assessment presented here finds that the ex-
periences in Tunisia in the early revolutionary stage up to summer 2012 
should have been less disruptive to subsequent changes. The outcome and 
speed of the initial regime change, the relatively small number of deaths and 
casualties, the exile, removal and/or arrest and imprisonment of many of the 
former ruling elite, and the holding of successful national elections suggest 
that Tunisia can move towards democracy. The nature of the early stage of 
the revolution in Egypt was assessed here to have been more disruptive than 
in Tunisia but less so than in Libya. The holding of parliamentary and presi-
dential elections as well as the arrest and trial of many members of the for-
mer ruling elite indicated that reform could be achievable over time.  
Libya faced significantly more difficult challenges from early 2011 to 
summer 2012. Extremely limited previous experience of civil and repre-
sentative political institutions and mass participation in political processes 
there meant that the early stage of the revolution was more disruptive than 
in Tunisia and Egypt. The early stage of the revolution in Libya, therefore, 
is likely to have a lasting impact on reform in Libya in the medium-term. 
The long duration of the uprising and civil conflict along with the high lev-
els of death, destruction and international involvement are also likely to 
hinder Libya’s move to democracy. Efforts at national reconciliation and 
compensation are going to be very important over the coming years. Never-
theless, the status of the former governing elite, the holding of local and na-
tional elections (which appear to have been transparent and fair) and the 
support (but not interference) of many in the international community will 
serve to help Libya ultimately achieve democratic governance over time.  
 
 
Özet: Bu makale, Tunus, Mısır ve Libya’da ortaya çıkan devrimlerin erken 
aşamalarının analizini yapmayı hedeflemiştir. Çalışma, devrimlerin 2010-
2011 kışından 2012 yazına kadarki erken aşamaları ele alarak, devrimlerin 
erken aşamalarının deneyimlerini karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle ortaya koy-
maktadır. Çalışmada ayrıca rejimlerin geçiş ve değişim süreçlerindeki unsur-
ları şu değişkenler etrafında el almıştır: 1) rejim değişikliği için ayaklanma-
nın takip süresi; 2) devrimlerin ilk sonuçları; 3) ölü ve yaralıların sayısı; 4) 
eski rejimdeki yönetim elitinin kilit üyelerinin statülerinin değişmesi; 5) re-
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jim değişikliği sonrası seçimlerin yapılabilmesi ve işlevi 6) uluslararası sis-
temle ilişki düzeyleri. Bu durumların her birinde temel benzerlikler vardır, 
fakat geçiş süreçlerinin bir biri ile doğrudan karşılaştırılamaz olduğunu des-
tekleyen bazı önemli farklılıklar da vardır. Bu makale ayrıca, bu devrimlerin 
erken aşamalarının her devletin değişim yönünü ve hızını nasıl etkileyebile-
ceği hakkında bazı konuları da dikkate getirmeye çalışmıştır. 
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